The purpose of this paper is to illuminate the main ethical, legal and social implications (ELSIs) concerning social humanoid robots that have their base in artificial intelligence (AI). The main dilemma highlighted touches upon the expansion of the concept of legal personhood, and the attribution of appropriate legal responses to govern the future proliferation of AI systems vis-à-vis social humanoid robots. The paper cautions on the need to carefully reflect on notions of personhood and human dignity for AI systems, balanced against the underlying representation of values and behaviors that may threaten to erode the human rights discourse. Additionally, it questions the wisdom of the broad expanse of the European legal response to the development and use of AI systems.
Introduction
Since the inception and coming into force of the Universal Declaration of Human Rights in 1948 (UDHR), 1 together with a wide range of international human rights instruments over the past few decades, contemporary democratic societies have grappled with a plethora of human rights issues in a varied international context. A cursory glance at major international dailies is proof positive of how modern societies have evolved. With this evolution, the necessity to continually define the boundaries of human rights mechanisms is also exemplified. Exciting developments in burgeoning research fields in the last decade, for example, in biotechnologies, nanotechnologies, neuroscience, the human genome, and revolutionary medical and scientific achievements, have simultaneously awed and caused concern. But in the last few years, two interesting characters in artificial intelligence (AI) have particularly captured the imagination of the creative effusion in human rights discourse: Harmony, 2 and Sophia, 3 both social humanoid robots. 4 In the constantly developing field of AI, in addition to the social discourses on benefits of AI to modern communities, much has also been raised about the ethical, legal and social implications (ELSIs) of these emerging technologies. Of particular concern is how they impact human lives, and whether, and how, legal systems should or can respond to these technological advancements to curb misuse. From considerations of AI as a legitimate subject of the law, 5 to autonomous AI systems, 6 to regulatory challenges in the robotics age, 7 there is much food for thought when the convergence between humankind and technologies becomes a reality. Because of this intersection, the appropriately formulated legal responses, along with human rights discourse, 1 'Universal Declaration of Human Rights' (6 October 2015) <http://www.un.org/en/universal-declaration-humanrights/> accessed 1 August 2018.
2 'Realbotix' <https://realbotix.com/> accessed 13 August 2018.
3 'Sophia the Robot Claims She Wants to Help Not Harm Humans' (7 May 2018) <http://www.digitaljournal.com/techand-science/technology/sophia-the-robot-claims-she-wants-to-help-not-harm-humans/article/521604> accessed 13 August 2018. 4 In recognition that the term 'AI' encompasses a wide variety of contemporary applications, this paper's focus is on the social humanoid robot that has been conceived as part of the AI technological advancement. As such, AI in this paper excludes other applications that relate to communication devices and technologies, military applications of AI, cryptocurrency, and the like. One of the premises I put forward in this paper (unlike the position of robot ethicists, and other advocates), is that I do not agree that it is prudent to extend the legal protection of human rights or attribute 'legal' personhood to robots, even social humanoid robots like Harmony and Sophia. I make this argument on the basis that human rights are foundationally premised on analogies of humanity and personhood: 43 essentially, a human being, and being human. Hence, in a manner not dissimilar to the Chinese Room argument first put forward by John Searle, 44 my position on nonextension of legal personhood to social humanoid robots is hinged upon the consciousness or intentionality that AI systems cannot, and do not possess. Furthermore, the doctrine of legal personhood has derived its legitimacy from various international human rights instruments, almost all of which emphasize the "human" nature and "human" dignity that such rights seek to protect.
The rationalization for legal personhood is a rationalization of the position of citizens within a legal constitutional framework. The legal system is essentially a creation of human beings, to 42 provide others protection and enforcement of the law. 45 Tomasz Pietrzykowski advances that the purpose of a legal system is foundational to the understanding of legal personhood. An extension of this legal personhood that detracts from the "traditional dualism of personhood and thinghood" 46 should not be undertaken lightly. Although it is simultaneously recognized that "things" may be capable of holding rights, the extension of right-holding to AI would necessarily involve the extension of personhood and legal status to an AI.
In evaluating the extension of personhood to AI, an interesting perspective was formulated by Rafal Michalczak, whose arguments essentially state that it may someday be possible to extend this to intelligent software vis-à-vis the subjectivization of non-human entities (AI) that would benefit human beings. 47 Another theory put forward by Alexis Dyschkant is that legal personhood should not simply be made contingent on humanity; and that we should "divorce the capacitiesfocused definition of legal personhood from the species-based definition of humanity." 48 Although it must be stipulated that Dyschkant's work focuses on legal personhood in respect of children, the corporation as an artificial person, fetuses and animals, the analogies are useful in applying similar rationality to forms of AI. He states that "we must remember the function of legal personhood is to attribute value and rights to the individual. We must first look to whether the creature is capable of having rights, and we do so by looking at their standing in society and relationship with others." 49 At this juncture, the advancement of AI technologies is nowhere close to granting robots a sense of prescience or to mold them into sentient beings; with AI, being distinct from Artificial General Intelligence (AGI). 50
Extending such concept of legal personhood, in the manner that has been bestowed upon addition, the examination of the concept of human dignity, which is an integral dimension of personhood, would also need to be reformulated. Although it is not easy to define "human dignity", and the concept, in itself, has been subject to varied juridical interpretation, 51 the contents of human dignity's main elements; intrinsic value, autonomy, and community value, 52 are at the heart of its importance. b. The Gendered Female Dimensions of "Cyborg" in Social Humanoid Robots
Beyond the engineered and mechanized aspects of social humanoid robots like Harmony and Sophia, the encroachment of the term "cyborg" is likely to make its entry. The corporeal form of the "cyborg" is central to the science fiction genre, and it is likely that we often associate the meaning of "cyborg" to a mechanized, bionic hybrid between human and machine. Manfred Clynes and Nathan Kline in 1960 essentially coined the term "cyborg" as a way of explaining a novel form of adaptation to new environments; by a self-regulating, functioning system that is able to "cooperate with the body's own autonomous homeostatic controls." 56 However, if we are able to critically differentiate the popular culture embodiment of "cyborg" from practical, contemporary applications of the "cyborg", it becomes clear that the present day "cyborg" has proliferated modern societies in many significant ways: in regenerative tissue engineering, medical prosthetics, neurological simulations, implantable technologies, militarization, and sports, amongst others. These applications are not within the scope of objection in many realms of discourse. Whether this stems from a lack of complete understanding of what a "cyborg" truly is, or whether the dramatization of the machine humanoid in fiction and fantasy is a much more attractive narrative, the dawn of the age of genetic engineering, and possibilities of a transhumanist future 57 captures the imagination in dark and mysterious ways.
In the meantime, the "cyborg" term has also shifted in its philosophical foundations in the 1980s, not simply encompassing the scientifically mechanical term, but "a more densely argued series of theoretical applications as a means to explore the interface between technology and the body." 58 It is within this scope that I advance the theoretical argument about the sexualized female to fulfill the fantasies of people ready to couple with a machine." 61 In a study on robo-sexism in Japan, Jennifer Robertson examined gender attribution to robots as "a process of reality construction", 62 and stated that roboticists' "naïve and unreflexive assumption about humans' differences informed how they imagined both the bodies and the social performances of their creations." 63 In modern democratic societies where we have constantly striven to recognize, protect and empower women's liberation, rights and equality, this seems to take us into a backwards dive when a no-holds-barred approach is encouraged for people to act out their "fantasies" with a proxy robot.
Another consideration in the objectification of women vis-à-vis these sex robots as proxies is how it may impact on issues of violence against women, rape, sexual assaults, and other acts of depravity that have no place in democratic societies. Proponents proclaim the benefits of using sex robots as proxies: to reduce sex workers, combat human sex trafficking, curb violence and rape against women (or children), amongst others. argues that "the design of realistic female robots that could explicitly refuse consent to sex in order to facilitate a rape fantasy would be unethical because sex with robots in these circumstances if a representation of the rape of a woman." 67 At the very heart of it, sex robots would merely serve as temporal plugs for a deeply-grounded depravity that would only be temporarily staunched.
Conclusion
With reference to the European Parliament Study, the European Parliament Report, I advance the statement that much more needs to be evaluated, particularly how social AI systems should be governed. In the European Parliament Study, the key findings appear to address practical issues.
However, they are also too broad, and focus on the mainly "robo-ethical principles for protecting humanity from robots." 68 Besides the protection of humanity from robots, which I believe sends an erroneous message that robots will take over the world, what should be emphasized is the ethical use of AI and robotics by human persons.
In the European Parliament Report, Mady Delvaux persuasively argues for a common legal framework for AI in the European sphere. The report itself is very comprehensive, and cognizant of the manifestations of AI in contemporary settings. However, there are significant questions raised (which have not been specifically addressed in the report common EU-wide definition of autonomous robots or AI systems. 70 This would be in addition to concerns about the notion of legal personhood that would possibly be enlarged to incorporate AI legal personalities. Questions regarding human nature and human dignity, the cornerstone of human rights discourse, are also likely to be reinvigorated. Additionally, we should also question if the purposes for which these social humanoid robots are used, should be governed. If this is the case, then there is a need to tread carefully as this encroaches upon the realm of privacy and individual liberties. Policing the purposes and uses of social humanoid robots may be desirable, but it runs the risk of opening policing into other areas with purposes that accompany the daily living of human beings, whether altruistic or not. This is reminiscent of a throwback to darker days, for example, when autocratic governments police leisure activities or reading materials.
It has already been proclaimed that humankind has now entered the Fourth Industrial Revolution, and in a similar way that the first three Industrial Revolutions have transformed societies, so too will our current digitalized world. It is never too early to begin analyzing and questioning how political and institutional structures, businesses and economies, the labour market and supply chain, and legal systems and human rights can play a positive role in developing ethics and human values in responsible robotics use. 
